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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & 
STATE LANDS, 
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v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; SIX MILE 
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an 
individual; MARK C. BLEAZARD, an 
individual; and JOHN D. BLEAZARD, 
an individual, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEES SIX MILE RANCH COMPANY, CRAIG S. 
BLEAZARD, MARK C. BLEAZARD AND JOHN D. BLEAZARD 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment (R. 345-348; Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum A) in favor of defendants that was entered in the Third Judicial District 
Court on May 8, 2000. The State of Utah filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 6, 
2000. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(j) and 78-2a-3(2) (1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeal. 
Appeal No. 20000493-SC 
Priority No. 15 (Subject to 
Assignment to Court of Appeals) 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did former Utah Code Ann. § 27r-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) require Tooele 
County to give written notice of the Petition to Vacate the West Stansbury Road to 
abutting landowners in addition to notice by publication? 
2. If so, did the statute require written notice to the State of Utah 
notwithstanding the fact that it was neither an owner of record of land abutting the West 
Stansbury Road nor did its address appear on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor? 
Standards of Review: Summary Judgment is appropriate when there is no issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Surety 
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; State ex reL Utah Air 
Quality Board v. Truman Mortens en Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, 5 16; Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court determines if the 
trial court erred in applying the governing law. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
915 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Utah 1996). Interpretations of a statute present questions of law 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court. Lieber v. ITT Hardford 
Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 72, t 7; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 
518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The full text of the relevant statutes are included in Addendum B of the Brief of 
Appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Nearly six years after Appellees believed a dispute regarding the status of the 
West Stansbury Road had been resolved when Tooele County vacated whatever 
interest, if any, it possessed in the road, the Division of Fire, Forestry and State Lands 
(the "Division") brought this action seeking to set aside that legislative action. 
Although the Division has not so much as alleged that it did not have actual knowledge 
and the opportunity to attend the hearing on the Petition to Vacate (R. 1-14), it claims 
that Tooele County Ordinance 93-9 must be set aside because the Division did not 
receive written notice of the Petition to Vacate (R. 13). 
As indicated by Figure 1 of Appellant's brief, the West Stansbury Road traverses 
the west side of Stansbury Island in a roughly north-south direction. As illustrated in 
Figure 1 (next page) and Addendum A to this brief, however, the only portion of the 
West Stansbury Road that was being claimed by Tooele County to be a county road was 
that portion of the road located to the south of approximately the middle of section 16 
of Township 2 North, Range 6 West (R. 234).] In preparing the Notice to Vacate, 
however, Tooele County included in the legal description of the lands involved all of 
the lands located above the meander line of the Great Salt Lake (R.94, 107). 
Accordingly, Tooele County considered landowners located above the meander 
line of the Great Salt Lake to be the abutting landowners, to wit: Six Mile Ranch 
1
 The road to the north of the portion of the West Stansbury Road that was claimed by Tooele County 
to be a public road is in fact a private easement leading to the MagCorp parcel and a private road across 
the MagCorp parcel to where it crosses the meander line of the Great Salt Lake (R. 300-3001). 
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FIGURE 1 (EXCERPT FROM ADDENDUM A^  
Company, Mark Bleazard, Craig Bleazard, John Bleazard, Rhea Castigno, Reese 
Richman, as Trustee of the Reese Richman Family Trust, Robert Cook, Amoco, 
Magnesium Corporation of America and the Bureau of Land Management (R. 297). 
Out of these abutting landowners, Six Mile Ranch Company, Mark Bleazard, Craig 
Bleazard, John Bleazard, Rhea Castigno, and Reese Richman were the petitioners 
seeking to have the West Stansbury Road vacated (R. 297). Further, it is undisputed 
that the remaining landowners, MagCorp, Amoco, Cook and the BLM, all had actual 
notice and the opportunity to appear at the hearing on the Petition to Vacate 
(R. 296-97). In fact, with the exception of Amoco, all of the abutting landowners 
attended the hearing on the Petition to Vacate (R. 296). 
As required by section 27-12-102.4, notice of the Petition to Vacate and the 
hearing thereon was published in a local newspaper, the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin, 
once a week for four consecutive weeks (R. 94, 107). Following publication, the 
Petition to Vacate became a matter of considerable public interest and was the subject 
of local radio and television coverage and articles in the local newspapers (R. 296). In 
fact, over forty people attended the public hearing in June of 1993, including 
representative(s) of MagCorp, the BLM, the Sierra Club, the Wasatch Mountain Club, 
the Utah Mountain Bike Association, the Tooele Wildlife Federation, and 
Representative Jim Gowans, a member of the Utah Legislature (R. 296). On 
August 17, 1993, by a vote of two to one, the Tooele County commissioners enacted 
4 
Ordinance 93-9 vacating any right Tooele County had acquired or was claiming in the 
West Stansbury Road (R. 296). 
In reliance on that Ordinance, Appellees Six Mile Ranch and the Bleazards 
thereafter erected a gate across the road and had expended nearly $100,000 in litigation 
with MagCorp concerning whether MagCorp had retained a private right-of-way in the 
road following its vacation and, if so, the scope and extent of that right-of-way (R. 7-8, 
265-296). Some six years later and during the pendency of that private litigation, the 
Division brought this action seeking to set aside Ordinance 93-9. In furtherance 
thereof, the Division filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that it, as an 
abutting landowner, was entitled to, but did not receive, written notice of the Petition to 
Vacate the West Stansbury Road.2 (R. 79-80) Tooele County opposed the motion by 
disputing that the Division is an abutting landowner because the subject sovereign lands 
do not abut the vacated public road, and in any event, by submitting the Affidavits of 
the Tooele County Assessor and the Tooele County Recorder attesting to the fact that 
the Division was neither the record owner of the sovereign lands nor did its address 
appear on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor (R. 112-118). In addition, Six Mile 
Ranch and the Bleazards filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment contending that 
because notice by publication had been made, written notice was not required under 
section 27-12-102.4 and, in any event, the Division was not entitled to written notice 
2
 Notably absent from the Division's motion was any assertion in its statement of undisputed facts that 
it was an owner of land abutting the portion of the West Stansbury Road that had been vacated 
(R.81-83). 
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because it was neither an abutting landowner of record, nor did its address appear on 
the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor (R. 284, 287-92, 337, 355 at 20-22 & 30-38). 
In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, District Judge David 
S. Young agreed with Appellees that section 27-12-102.4 did not require written notice 
to abutting landowners because notice by publication had been made. In any event, 
even assuming the statute required written notice to abutting landowners in addition to 
notice by publication, Judge Young concluded that the Division was nevertheless not 
entitled to such notice because it was neither an abutting landowner of record nor did its 
mailing address appear on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor. Consequently, as a 
matter of law, therefore, Judge Young concluded that Tooele County had complied with 
the notice requirements of section 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) and granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants (R. 345-38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, the Division does not claim that the lower court erred in granting 
summary judgment because there existed disputed issues of material fact. Rather, the 
Division contends that the lower court erred: 
(1) in construing the meaning of section 27-12-102.4 to the effect that it did 
not require written notice be mailed to abutting landowners because notice 
by publication had been made; and 
(2) ruling that, in any event, even assuming written notice was required, the 
Division would not have been entitled to such notice because it was not an 
6 
abutting landowner of record whose address appears on the rolls of the 
Tooele County Assessor. 
Contrary to the arguments of the Division, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 is 
ambiguous at best as to whether written notice to abutting landowners is required in 
addition to notice by publication. Depending on the significance attached to the 
placement of a single comma, the statute can be read to either require written notice in 
addition to notice by publication or, alternatively, written notice only when notice by 
publication is not available. Subsequent to the enactment of Ordinance 93-9, however, 
the Legislature revised and recodified section 27-12-102.4 into a new section 72-3-108 
effective March 21, 1998. As the Division itself acknowledges in its brief at p. 19, 
under the recodified version of the statute the Legislature clearly manifested its intent 
that written notice be required only in the absence of notice by publication. Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-3-108(2) (Supp. 1999) (amended 2000). Appellant's brief Addendum B. 
Despite this clear manifestation of legislative intent and without citing to any 
direct evidence whatsoever, the Division asserts that the recodified version of the 
statute was a "mistake" that would lead to unlawful and absurd results. Contrary to the 
arguments of the Division, the requiring of written notice only in instances where 
notice by publication has not been made does not raise due process concerns, is not 
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and is not contrary to Nelson v. Provo City, 
872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). Finally, given that an amendment (as opposed to a 
recodification) to a statute is presumed to change prior law absent clear evidence to the 
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contrary, the fact that the Legislature recently amended section 72-3-108 to require 
written notice in addition to notice by publication3 undermines rather than supports the 
Division's construction of section 27-12-102.4. 
In any event, even assuming section 27-12-102.4 required written notice in 
addition to notice by publication, it does not follow that the Division was entitled to 
such notice. The clear and unambiguous language of section 27-12-102.4 only requires 
that written notice be mailed to abutting landowners of record whose addresses also 
appear on the rolls of the County Assessor. Here, it is undisputed that the Division was 
not an owner of record and, as a consequence, its address as such did not appear on the 
rolls of the Tooele County Assessor. Thus, even if the requirements of section 
27-12-102.4 are strictly applied, as a matter of law the Division would not have been 
entitled to receive written notice. 
The Division's attempt to avoid that conclusion by arguing that the basis of the 
lower court's ruling was that the Division does not pay taxes is without merit. As set 
forth in the Order Granting Summary Judgment, the express basis of the court's ruling 
was that "the Division was not a party to whom such written notice would be have been 
required to be provided because it was not an abutting property owner on the rolls of 
the Tooele County Assessor." (R. 345-348). Likewise, the Division's effort to shift the 
blame to Tooele County for its own failure to record the Division's ownership interest 
3
 The recent amendment also specifically requires notice in every case be provided to the Utah 
Department of Transportation, a requirement that was absent from both the earlier versions of the 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (2000). 
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in the sovereign lands is without merit. Under Utah law, it is the owner of property 
that has the legal duty to record an interest, not third parties. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 27-12-102.4 DID NOT REQUIRE TOOELE 
COUNTY TO PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE 
ABUTTING LANDOWNERS. 
A. At Best Section 27-12-102.4 Is Ambiguous As To Whether Or 
Not The Legislature Intended To Require Written Notice In 
Addition To Notice By Publication. 
In its brief, the Division argues that the plain and unambiguous language of 
section 27-12-102.4, as punctuated, required Tooele County to provide written notice 
in addition to notice by publication. Brief of Appellant at pp. 11-16. As the Division 
must and does concede, however, depending on the meaning attached to the use and 
placement of a single comma, section 27-12-102.4 can be read to either require mailing 
of written notice only if notice by publication has not been made or, alternatively, to 
require mailing of written notice in addition to notice by publication. Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 13-14. In other words, the Division has implicitly conceded in its 
brief that section 27-12-102.4 does have two reasonable interpretations. Appellant's 
brief at pp. 11-17. 
Given the legislative history subsequent to the enactment of section 27-12-102.4, 
the Division's concession in this regard would have been difficult to avoid. Although 
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the punctuation of a statute can be a useful tool in ascertaining legislative intent {see, 
e.g., Board of Education v. Hanchett, 167 P. 686, 687 (Utah 1917)), as a general rule, 
punctuation in and of itself is afforded little weight and will be entirely disregarded if 
contrary to legislative intent. See, e.g., Id.; Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, 379 P.2d 880, 884 
(Ore. 1963). 
Indeed, the legislative history of section 27-12-102.4 itself demonstrates the 
wisdom of not placing undue reliance on the use of punctuation. Following the 
enactment of Ordinance 93-9, section 27-12-102.4 was recodified in the 1998 
Legislature as section 72-3-108. In performing that recodification, the legislative 
history evidences, and the parties agree, that the Legislature did not intend to change 
the meaning of the prior statute. See Appellant's brief at pp. 18-19. Given that the 
Legislature has construed section 27-12-102.4 to have an entirely different meaning 
than that being argued by the Division, it is apparent that at a minimum the statute is 
capable of reasonably being read to have more than one meaning. Thus, the issue in 
this case is whose construction is correct — the construction being urged by the 
Division, or the construction adopted by the Legislature. 
B. The Legislative History Evidences That The Legislature Did 
Not Intend To Require Written Notice In Instances Where 
There Has Been Notice By Publication. 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, this Court first looks to the 
plain meaning of the statute. Strawberry Elec. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 875 
(Utah 1996). If the statute is ambiguous, this Court then resorts to legislative purpose, 
10 
relevant policy considerations and history for guidance. World Peace Movement v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). In construing legislative 
intent, courts follow well established rules of statutory construction. One of the most 
well recognized rules of statutory construction is that, absent evidence to the contrary, 
the Legislature in enacting legislation is presumed to have done so advisedly. Stephens 
v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). Thus, the statutory words 
are read literally unless such reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Id. 
Another well established rule of statutory construction is that a legislative intent to 
change the meaning of a statute in the course of a general revision or recodification will 
not be inferred unless that intent is clearly and indubitably manifested. See e.g., 
Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 882 P.2d 1312, 1321-22 (Colo. 1994). Absent 
a clear manifestation of a contrary intent, therefore, a statute that has been revised or 
recodified is presumed to reflect the legislative intent of the prior statute. Id. 
Here, the Division itself acknowledges in its brief that when the Legislature 
revised and recodified section 27-12-102.4 it did not intend to make substantive changes 
in the meaning of that statute. In fact, Appellant gives legislative history from the floor 
debate where the sponsor of the bill underscored that point. Yet, as the Division 
further concedes, consistent with the construction adopted by the lower court, the 
recodified version of section 27-12-102.4 only requires written notice when notice by 
publication has not been made. See Appellant's brief at pp. 18-19. 
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Consequently, this Court is herein called upon to interpret a statute that was 
ambiguous at the time that the West Stansbury Road was vacated but which ambiguity 
was resolved when it was subsequently revised and recodified. Absent clear evidence 
to the contrary, therefore, the recodified version of the statute must be presumed to 
reflect the legislative intent of the prior statute. 
In arguing for a contrary interpretation, however, the Division maintains that the 
Legislature simply made a "mistake" when it recodified section 27-12-102.4 as section 
72-3-108. The Division offers no evidence of who the "1998 rewriters" referenced in 
its brief were, how they made such a mistake, no legislative history acknowledging a 
mistake, or even any basis to conclude that recent amendments to the statute made 
during the 2000 legislative session were intended to correct such a mistake. Instead, 
the Division relies exclusively on its argument that the statute, as construed by the 
lower court, would deprive abutting landowners to due process of law, would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and a prior appellate court decision, and is 
contrary to existing law. 
For the reasons discussed below, each of these arguments is without merit. 
1. Contrary To The Arguments Of The Division, Notice By 
Publication Does Not Violate An Abutting Property Owner's Right 
To Due Process Of Law. 
Citing Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968), the Division 
argues that Appellees' construction of section 27-12-102.4 would violate an abutting 
landowner's right to due process of law. In so doing, however, the Division displays a 
12 
lack of understanding regarding the nature of the governmental action involved in 
vacating a public road. Contrary to the belief of the Division, procedural due process 
does not apply to a legislative action to vacate a road. 
As indicated by the express language in section 27-12-102.4, the decision to 
vacate a road is to be made by "the legislative body" of the county by "ordinance." 
Other states also categorize such actions as legislative. See, e.g., North Laramie Land 
Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 282-285 (1925) (wherein the court held that the 
decision to establish a public road is a legislative function); Nyman v. City of Eugene, 
593 P.2d 515, 521 (Ore. 1979) (wherein the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the 
decision to widen a road was a policy decision of a legislative nature) and Thayer v. 
King County, 731 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Wash. App. 1997) (holding that the power to 
vacate a road is a political function). 
Procedural due process, however, does not attach to legislative decisions, but 
rather, only to decisions which are adjudicative in nature. See e.g., Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Horn v. County of Ventura, 596 P.2d 
1134 (Cal. 1979). By its very nature and function, the legislative process itself 
provides all process due. County of Fairfax v. Southern Iron Works, 410 S.E.2d 674, 
679 (Va. 1991). Thus, the only notice Tooele County was required to provide was 
whatever notice was required by the legislature by statute in section 27-12-102.4, and 
no notice requirement is derived from any constitutional due process principle. 
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In addition to not being an adjudicative decision, a decision to vacate a road is 
not a "taking" within the meaning of due process. An abutting property owner only 
has a legal right to reasonable access to his or her property. See e.g., Memmott v. 
Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) (finding the diversion caused by the 
relocation of a portion of a road did "not constitute a deprivation of reasonable 
access..."); Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 649 (Utah 1982) (holding that an abutting 
landowner only has a right of reasonable access); and Bailey Services & Supply Corp. 
v. State Road Commission, 533 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1975) (finding that the 
construction of the a viaduct did not constitute a "taking" despite preventing plaintiff 
from being able to access his warehouse with large size trucks). Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-3-108(3), an abutting landowner to a vacated public road retains a private 
right of way in that road if required to reasonably access the property. See e.g., 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 437-38 (Utah 1993) and Mason, 656 P.2d at 468. By 
definition therefore, the decision to vacate a road does not deprive the abutting 
landowner of the right to reasonable access. Absent a "taking," due process is not an 
issue. 
It follows therefrom that the due process concerns addressed in Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County do not arise under section 27-12-102.4. Contrary to the arguments of the 
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Division, therefore, the construction adopted by the lower court does not raise concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of the statute.4 
2. Contrary To The Arguments Of The Division, The Construction 
Adopted By The Lower Court Is Consistent With The Legislative 
Purpose Of The Statute. 
In its brief, the Division argues that the purpose of the statute is to provide 
notice of the petition and hearing to both the general public and the abutting landowners 
so that a county commission can consider their input in determining whether or not to 
vacate a road. Without any factual foundation whatsoever, the Division then goes on to 
state in a summary fashion that u[t]he Legislature could not have thought the input 
necessary under section 27-12-102.4 would reach the county commissioners if the only 
notice given was notice to the general public in a local newspaper." Brief of Appellant 
at p. 15. 
Contrary to the argument of the Division, notice by publication to the general 
public is not mutually exclusive of notice to abutting landowners. Given that abutting 
landowners are also members of the general public, the Legislature could have easily 
concluded that notice by publication to the general public would also provide sufficient 
notice to abutting landowners to satisfy the statutory purpose of providing such notice. 
4
 In this connection, the court is referred to Utah Code Ann. § 72-4-102 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-4-102.5. In these sections, a state highway may be deleted from the state highway system (which 
state highway may serve state-wide purposes (§ 72-4-102.5(2)(a), and also may provide access to 
property (§ 72-4-102.5(2)(f)) by the legislature or by the Department of Transportation submitting a list 
to the legislature of highways to be deleted for approval of the legislature. Consistent with the fact that 
decisions to vacate public roads are legislative in nature and do not implicate due process concerns, no 
publication in any newspaper whatsoever and no notice to abutting landowners whatsoever, is required. 
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In fact, it has long been recognized that notice by publication of legislative 
decisions to establish a public road [or to vacate such a road] is a sufficient means of 
notifying both the general public and abutting landowners of the proposed legislative 
action. For example, in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925), an 
action challenging the sufficiency of notice of intent to establish a public road, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of 
statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by 
them and when that procedure is not unreasonable or 
arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations relieving 
them from conforming to it.... Owners of real estate may so 
order their affairs that they may be informed of tax and 
condemnation proceedings of which there is published 
notice, and the law may be framed in recognition of that 
fact. In consequence, it has been uniformly held that 
statutes providing for taxation or condemnation of land may 
adopt a procedure, summary in character, and that notice of 
such proceedings may be indirect, provided only that the 
period of notice of the initiation of proceedings and the 
method of giving it are reasonably adapted to the nature of 
the proceedings and their subject matter and afford to the 
property owner reasonable opportunity at some stage of the 
proceedings to protect his property from an arbitrary or 
unjust appropriation. 
Id. at 283. 
Moreover, as aptly illustrated in this case, a legislative proposal to vacate a 
public road is an issue that invariably engenders widespread public comment and 
interest. As the undisputed facts of record disclose, following the publication of the 
Petition to Vacate, that proposed legislative action became the subject of widespread 
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media attention (R. 296). As a result of the public interest generated thereby, over 
forty people attended the hearing before the county commission (R. 296). In addition 
to interested citizens who attended in their individual capacities, those in attendance 
included a State legislator, representative(s) of the Sierra Club, the Wasatch Mountain 
Club, the Utah Mountain Bike Association, the Tooele Wildlife Federation, MagCorp 
and the BLM, and all of the owners or record of land abutting the road except one who 
had previously expressed its neutrality (R. 296). 
Given the widespread public interest that such petitions engender, the legislature 
could have reasonably concluded that notice by publication alone would be sufficient to 
apprise abutting landowners of that proposed legislative action. Conversely, in 
instances where notice by publication was not possible (where no newspaper of general 
circulation is published in the county), the legislature could have reasonably concluded 
that notice by posting alone would not be sufficient to generate such widespread interest 
and knowledge. Thus, in such instances, the legislature could just as reasonably have 
concluded that written notice to abutting landowners should be required. 
Contrary to the arguments of the Division, therefore, it is readily apparent that 
the construction urged by Appellees and adopted by the lower court is not inconsistent 
with the purpose of the statute. 
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3. Contrary To The Arguments Of The Division, The Construction 
Adopted By The Lower Court Is Not Inconsistent With The Utah 
Court Of Appeal's Decision In Nelson v. Provo City. 
The Division's assertion that the construction adopted by the lower court is 
contrary to the decision in Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994) is 
without merit. Unlike the present instance, that case involved a complete and utter 
failure on the part of the city to provide any meaningful notice, written or otherwise. 
Although the court admittedly stated in dicta without meaningful analysis that the statute 
required notice by publication and written notice, the facts in that case did not require 
the court to address the specific question at issue herein. In addition, the decision in 
Nelson was rendered prior to the 1998 recodification of section 27-12-102.4 as section 
72-3-108 in which the Legislature manifested a contrary intent. Thus, the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Nelson v Provo City did not have the benefit of the legislature's 
subsequent manifestation of its intent to only require written notice in instances where 
notice by publication is not available. 
Consequently, the Divisions' reliance on that decision is misplaced. 
4. Contrary To The Arguments Of The Division, the Amendment 
Made To Section 72-3-108 During The 2000 Legislative Session 
Does Not Vindicate Its Position. 
In its brief the Division refers to the recent amendment to section 72-3-108 
during the 2000 legislative session. In that legislation, the legislature expressly 
amended section 72-3-108 to require notice to the Utah Department of Transportation 
and to abutting landowners whenever a county vacates a public road, regardless as to 
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whether the State is an abutting landowner or notice by publication has been made. 
Without citing to any legislative history whatsoever in support of its position, the 
Division asserts that this amendment was intended to correct the legislature's prior 
error in 1998 when it restructured and recodified section 27-12-102.4 so as to only 
require written notice when notice by publication is not available. Absent evidence of a 
contrary intent, however, it is a well settled rule of statutory construction that an 
amendment to a statute manifests the Legislature's intent to effectuate a change in the 
law. See, e.g., Totorica v. Western Equipment Co., 401 P.2d 817, 821 (Idaho 1965). 
Contrary to the arguments of the Division, therefore, the recent amendment of section 
72-3-108 actually supports Appellees' position that prior thereto written notice was only 
required where notice by publication was not available. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING THAT SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED 
BOTH WRITTEN NOTICE AND NOTICE BY 
PUBLICATION, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE DIVISION WOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO SUCH NOTICE IN ANY 
EVENT. 
Regardless as to how this court resolves the ambiguity concerning whether or not 
written notice was required, the decision of the lower court must be affirmed because: 
1. The undisputed facts of record established that as a matter of law the 
Division was not an abutting landowner; and 
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2. In any event, the Division was not an abutting landowner of record as a 
matter of law and, as a consequence, its address did not appear on the 
rolls of the Tooele county Assessor. 
A. As A Matter Of Law, The Division Was Not An Abutting 
Landowner. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Division sets forth as an 
undisputed fact that it did not receive written notice of the Petition to Vacate (R. 107). 
Nowhere in its Statement of Undisputed Facts, however, did the Division set forth that 
it was the owner of lands abutting the vacated portion of the West Stansbury Road that 
Tooele County was claiming at the time to be county road. 
Conversely, Tooele County submitted the affidavit of the Tooele County 
recorder attesting to the fact that the Division "was not an owner of property abutting 
the West Stansbury Road..." (R. 114) Likewise, in support of Six Mile Ranch and the 
Bleazard's cross motion for summary judgment, they set forth as an undisputed fact of 
record that the only portion of the West Stansbury Road that at the time was being 
claimed by Tooele County to be a county road was located above and did not abut the 
meander line of the Great Salt Lake and, therefore, did not abut the sovereign lands at 
issue (R. 299-300). 
In response thereto, the Division did not dispute as a factual matter said 
Appellees' assertions of fact, let alone with citations to the record. In fact, the Division 
did not dispute any of Appellee Six Mile Ranch's and the Bleazards thirty-six separately 
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enumerated statements of undisputed facts. Because the Division did not dispute those 
facts, for purposes of this appeal those facts are deemed to have been admitted. Utah 
R. Civ. Procedure, Rule 56(e); Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1087 
(Utah 1975). 
It follows therefrom that as a matter of law the Division is not an abutting 
landowner to the portion of the West Stansbury Road that was vacated. 
B* As A Matter Of Law, The Division Was Neither An Owner Of 
Record Nor Did Its Address Appear On The Rolls Of The 
Tooele County Assessor. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in section 27-12-102.4 regarding whether written 
notice was required in addition to notice by publication, the statute clearly and 
unambiguously only requires that written notice be provided to "all owners of 
record...addressed to the mailing address appearing on the rolls of the county 
assessor...." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993). In Appellant's brief, the 
Division admits that it was neither an owner of record nor did its address appear on the 
rolls of the Tooele County Assessor. (Brief of Appellant at pp. 20-21) A priori, under 
the plain and unambiguous terms of section 27-12-102.4, the Division was not a party 
entitled to notice even assuming that it was (1) an abutting landowner and (2) the statute 
required such notice to be provided. 
In an attempt to avoid this inescapable conclusion, the Division first attempts to 
sidestep this issue by arguing that the basis of the lower court's ruling was that the 
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Division was not a "taxpayer."5 Brief of Appellant at pp. 20-26. This argument, 
however, mischaracterizes the record. Contrary to the arguments of the Division, as 
expressly set forth in the Order Granting Summary Judgment, the lower court ruled that 
assuming section 27-12-102.4 required written notice to be provided in addition to 
notice by publication, summary judgment in favor of defendants was nevertheless 
appropriate "because the Division was not an abutting property owner on the rolls of 
the Tooele County Assessor as specified therein." (Brief of Appellant, Addendum A at 
p. 2). Likewise, in making its oral ruling following argument of counsel the lower 
court does not state that the basis of its decision was that the Division is not a taxpayer. 
(Brief of Appellant, Addendum C). 
Similarly, in an effort to sidestep the fact that it was not an owner of record, the 
Division in its brief attempts to blame Tooele County for that omission. To that end, 
the Division cites the Court to Utah Code Ann. § 17-12-22 (1999) requiring county 
recorders to prepare plats showing the record owners of property and Utah Code Ann. 
5
 Although some argument was presented to the lower court concerning tax paying property owners, 
the Division's arguments to the effect that (1) only tax payers are on the rolls of the county assessor, 
and (2) providing notice only to tax payers is a manifestly absurd, are inaccurate and misplaced. The 
Division shows in its brief and in Addendum G thereto, examples of numerous State-owned parcels in 
Tooele County (all of which appear to be some distant away from Stansbury Island) that the State has 
chosen to place on the rolls of the county assessor. Each of the ten parcels for which the county 
assessor information has an address associated with it on an individual basis. Even though ownership 
of each parcel is in the State, the ten parcels have among them six different addresses, evidencing that 
the State has designated different departments or agencies concerned with the different parcels. 
Clearly, the State has the ability and responsibility to place its land ownership on the rolls of the county 
assessor. Similarly, even though in its brief the Division argues that owners of the Matheson 
Courthouse, the City and County Building, the Salt Lake Temple, the University Hospital and other 
property tax exempt parcels would not receive a notice, attached hereto as Addendum B are certified 
copies of the Salt Lake County Assessor's records listing various of such properties on the rolls of the 
Salt Lake County Assessor, along with the appropriate addresses for mailing of notices. 
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§ 59-2-303 (1996) requiring assessors to be fully acquainted with property in the 
county. Brief of Appellant at p. 21. Notably absent, however, from the Division's 
recitation of the statutory authority for its contention, however, is Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-102 and Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 imposing the burden of recording an 
ownership in property on the owner of that property — in this case, the Division. 
The fact of the matter is that notwithstanding its inappropriate suggestions to the 
contrary on pp. 2 & 24 of its brief, the Division is not an owner of record, the Division 
is the party at fault for that omission, and as a consequence, the rolls of the Tooele 
County Assessor do not show the address to which notice under that statute would be 
mailed. Because the Division was neither an owner of record nor did its address appear 
on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor, it follows that it was not entitled under the 
clear language of section 27-12-102.4 to written notice. The decision of the lower 
court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants must therefore be affirmed. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH AGAINST 
CONSTRUING SECTION 27-12-102.4 TO HAVE REQUIRED 
THAT WRITTEN NOTICE BE PROVIDED TO THE 
DIVISION. 
Contrary to there being a basis to ignore section 27-12-102.4 as written and 
declare the Ordinance invalid, there are substantial and significant public policy reasons 
to uphold the Ordinance as valid. The Division would have this Court believe that 
upholding Ordinance is an absurd result, even though (1) it was not an owner of record, 
(2) all owners of record received actual notice and participated or waived participation 
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at the hearing, (3) reliance on the Ordinance has been placed for over seven years by 
the private parties owning property along the road, investing time and capital in 
reliance on the validity of the Ordinance, and (4) the Division has numerous means of 
alternative access to the lake bed in the Stansbury basin and elsewhere. On the 
contrary, it would be an absurd result to overturn the Ordinance under those 
circumstances and interpret section 27-12-102.4 as suggested by the Division. 
Such an interpretation would be contrary to the public policy in favor of citizens 
being able to rely on legislative decisions made by elected officials. More importantly, 
construing section 27-12-102.4 to require written notice to abutting landowners who are 
not of record and whose addresses do not appear on the rolls of the County Assessor 
would create undue confusion and uncertainty regarding when such notice is required. 
As a result, it would open the door to other parties claiming in other instances that they 
too should have received notice of a petition to vacate and thereby other decisions to 
vacate roads should be set aside. Indeed, this risk is not an idle one. Like the 
sovereign lands at issue herein, there exist vast tracks of land throughout the State of 
Utah that have never been severed from the public domain going back to Statehood. As 
is the case here, because those lands have never been severed into parcels that would 
have been recorded and issued a parcel number, it is likely that these lands too have not 
been recorded and do not appear on the rolls of the County Assessor in which said 
lands are located. Because such lands constitute a majority of the lands within the State 
of Utah, it is likely that secondary county roads like the West Stansbury Road run 
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through and abut those lands. Furthermore, there likely are numerous private owners 
of parcels or tracts of land whose interests are not of record. 
Assuming the owner of such public lands, be it the State of Utah or the United 
States, or private owners of parcels or tracts of land, did not receive notice of a petition 
to vacate, therefore, the legality of all such prior vacations that have taken place during 
the many years since at least the enactment of section 27-12-102.4 up to the effective 
date of the 2000 amendment would be suspect. 
To the extent that this Court believes that the statute should have required notice 
to the State, or in all cases should so require, the court nevertheless need not address 
that issue. The statute has already been amended and that issue was addressed by the 
Legislature in the 2000 amendment which now requires notice to be given to the State 
for any proposed vacation.6 Addendum B to Division's brief, last page. Thus, a ruling 
in favor of the Division in this case would remedy no future problems respecting county 
vacation ordinances, but could have the potential to create serious title problems by 
opening up to challenge previously-enacted ordinances vacating public roads that have 
been enacted over the years. 
6
 One of the bases of the lower court's ruling was that the County represented the public interest, and 
that has been the legislative scheme with respect to roads of this nature for some for time. Addendum 
C to Division's brief, p. 43, lines 9-11. The statutory scheme in place for many years prior to 2000 
was that the counties represented the public interest, and even the interests of the State insofar as 
counties were political subdivisions of the State. Public policy should certainly have required nothing 
further in the way of the representation of the public interest during such time. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Division was not entitled to written notice of the Petition to 
Vacate the West Stansbury Road because (1) section 27-12-102.4 did not require 
written notice in addition to notice by publication, and (2) in any event, the Division 
was neither an abutting landowner nor was it an owner of record whose address 
appeared on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of December, 2000. 
GEORGE S. YOUNG (#3589) 
BRENT A. BOHMAN (#4275) 
Attorneys for Other Appellees 
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Utah Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Douglas Ahlstrom 
Tooele County Attorney 
47 South Main 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
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ADDENDA 
Tab A 
TabB 
TATE OF UTAH DIVISION 
AC CONSTR & MGMNT 
50 N STATE ST # N4110 
ALT LAKE CITY UT 
OC: 450 S STATE ST 
UB: TYPE UNKN PLAT 
11/29/2000 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION FOR TAXATION PURPOSES ONLY 
BEG NE COR LOT 6, BLK 39, PLAT A, SLC SUR; S 0-i00'40n E 
660.15 FT; S 89->58,24" W 330.06 FT; N 0-.00'59" W 660.15 FT; 
N 89-.58'24" E 330.12 FT TO BEG. 
OF FKllMi v uruAia 
LEGAL 
TAX CLASS OE 
EDIT 1 FACTOR BYPASS 
84114110450 
EDIT 1 BOOK 7846 
K£IH_LJ C£>X*\J.& 
BUILDINGS 
MOTOR VEHIC 
TOTAL VALUE 
PAGE 0001 DATE 
~J \J JL -L \J \J \J 
68000000 
0 
0 
01/08/1999 
FKEYS: 1=VTNH 2=VTOP 4=VTAU 6=NEXT 7=RTRN VTAS 8=RXMU 10=RXBK 11=RXPN 12=PREV 
This is a true and correct copy of 
a Real Property Assessment 
Record on file in the Salt Lake 
County^ssessor!s Office. /? 
^Assessor 
Date 
ALT LAKE TABERNAL'Lfci r m w i v ^ i ^ . ^ 
DRPORATION LEGAL BUILDINGS 60003100 
LDS CHURCH REAL ESTATE DIVISN TAX CLASS BE MOTOR VEHIC 0 
0 E NORTHTEMPLE ST #12 00 EDIT 1 FACTOR BYPASS TOTAL VALUE 0 
&LT LAKE CITY UT 84150000250 
OC: 50 W SOUTHTEMPLE ST EDIT 1 BOOK 8013 PAGE 2751 DATE 09/14/1998 
TYPE UNKN PLAT 
UB: il/29/2000 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION FOR TAXATION PURPOSES O LY 
LOTS 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, BLK 87, PLAT A, SLC SUR. 7992-1495 
•FKEYS: 1=VTNH 2=VTOP 4=VTAU 6=NEXT 7=RTRN VTAS 8=RXMU 10=RXBK 11=RXPN 12=PREV 
aReRcoradoPrfSer1nSeSaULaKe 
C o u n ^ A s s e s s o ^ s O f f . a ^ ^ ^ 
By-
Date 
v^ » J. is J. x J . J \LT LAKE CITY rxvo-x^ 
LEGAL BUILDINGS 58000000 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT TAX CLASS OE MOTOR VEHIC 0 
51 S STATE ST # 345 EDIT 1 FACTOR BYPASS TOTAL VALUE 0 
\LT LAKE CITY UT 84111310451 
DC: 451 S STATE ST EDIT 1 BOOK 5881 PAGE 0600 DATE 02/27/1987 
JB: TYPE UNKN PLAT 
11/29/2000 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION FOR TAXATION PURPOSES ONLY 
ALL OF BLK 38, PLAT A, SLC SURVEY. 
FKEYS: 1=VTNH 2=VTOP 4=VTAU 6=NEXT 7=RTRN VTAS 8=RXMU 10=RXBK 11=RXPN 12=PREV 
This is a true and correct copy ot 
a Real Property Assessment 
Record on file in the Salt Lake 
County Assessor's Office, 
By ( 'gjuJt^A S 
/ty Assessor 
Date / / / . - ^ / ^ ^ f 
LEGAL BUILDINGS 30903100 
TAX CLASS BE MOTOR VEHIC 0 
0 E NORTHTEMPLE ST EDIT 1 FACTOR BYPASS TOTAL VALUE 0 
ALT LAKE CITY UT 84150000250 
OC: 49 N MAIN ST EDIT 1 BOOK 7992 PAGE 1495 DATE 09/14/1998 
UB: TYPE UNKN PLAT 
11/29/2000 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION FOR TAXATION PURPOSES ONLY 
LOTS 6, 7 & 8, BLK 87, PLAT A, SLC SUR. 
FKEYS: 1=VTNH 2=VTOP 4=VTAU 6=NEXT 7=RTRN VTAS 8=RXMU 10=RXBK 11=RXPN 12=PREV 
This is a true and correct copy of 
a Real Property Assessment 
Recordjon file in the Salt Lake 
CounlyyUsessojte Office^? 
By ( gstw/'tf s/S^-aLJ 
Deputy Assessor 
JK¥ Ut' ftS Ut L.T1 UL \JF IJJUO rs\±iM± v u r u n j - u j.v±^ ir-xxj J_Ii^ j . n J . J _ J ^ J . J . W ^ W ^ 
LEGAL BUILDINGS 12000000 
LDS CH TAX ADMIN TAX CLASS BE MOTOR VEHIC 0 
0 E NORTHTEMPLE ST EDIT 1 FACTOR BYPASS TOTAL VALUE 0 
^LT LAKE CITY UT 84150000250 
DC: 161 N MAIN ST EDIT 1 BOOK 7703 PAGE 1943 DATE 03/11/1998 
JB: TYPE UNKN PLAT 
11/29/2000 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION FOR TAXATION PURPOSES ONLY 
ALL OF LOTS 1 THROUGH 8, BLK 94, PLAT A, SLC SUR. 
7854-224,225, 7865-734 
FKEYS: 1=VTNH 2=VTOP 4=VTAU 6=NEXT 7=RTRN VTAS 8=RXMU 10=RXBK 11=RXPN 12=PREV 
This is a true and correct copy of 
a Real Property Assessment 
Record on file in the Salt Lake 
CounJ^ssessotfS Officey? 
Bv LL^J-&fKJ AJ^^JL^ 
D e p i $ Assessor 
Date MM31SML 
